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We study the behavior and emotional arousal of the participants in an experimental
auction, leading to an asymmetric social dilemma involving an auctioneer and two bidders.
An antisocial transfer (bribe) which is beneficial for the auctioneer (official) is paid, i
promised, by the winner of the auction. Some pro-social behavior on both the auctioneers’
and the bidders’ sides is observed even in the absence of any punishment mechanism
(Baseline, Treatment 0). However, pro-social behavior is adopted by the vast majority of
subjects when the loser of the auction can inspect the transaction between the winner
and the auctioneer (Inspection, Treatment 1). The inspection and punishment mechanism
is such that, if a bribe is (not) revealed, both corrupt agents (the denouncing bidder) lose(s)
this period’s payoffs. This renders the inspection option unprofitable for the loser and is
rarely used, especially toward the end of the session, when pro-social behavior becomes
pervasive. Subjects’ emotional arousal was obtained through skin conductance responses.
Generally speaking, our findings suggest that stronger emotions are associated with
decisions deviating from pure monetary reward maximization, rather than with (un)ethical
behavior per se. In fact, using response times as a measure of the subject’s reflection
during the decision-making process, we can associate emotional arousal with the conflict
between primary or instinctive and secondary or contemplative motivations and, more
specifically, with deviations from the subject’s pure monetary interest.
f
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1. INTRODUCTION
A moral dilemma emerges when different motivations of human
behavior dictate opposite actions in a given decision-making con-
text. In economic situations, the most appealing type of dilemma
concerns the conflict between selfish monetary reward maximiza-
tion and adherence to some ethical pro-social norm, especially
when the latter implies an economic loss. The emotional impli-
cations of such conflicts seem to originate, from the interplay
between a basic impulse for greedy money-seeking motivations
and alternative, more sophisticated social and personal ethical
norms1. In this paper, we obtain behavioral data and emotional
responses by the participants in a laboratory experiment based
on a moral dilemma designed as a public procurement auction
with the option of an anti-social bribe by the winner of the auc-
tion to the auctioneer. Our results indicate that strong emotions
are associated with actions against monetary reward maximiza-
tion, rather than with the fulfillment or the violation of an ethical
norm per se.
Despite the broadly criticized reductionist construct of
an emotionless utility-maximizing machine known as Homo
Oeconomicus, there is growing consensus among economists that
1As for example, in Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
emotions matter in economic decisions. In everyday economic
transactions, people act according to intrinsic motivations and
ethical standards, often against their pure economic interests.
In fact, in many financial decisions, non-economic motivations
like a mother’s altruism or an activist’s ideology, may dominate
economic motives. The basic research agenda aimed at explain-
ing human behavior in the presence of conflicting motivations
relies on models assuming coexisting alternative objectives in
the decision-maker’s utility function. Two exceptions to this are
Sen’s (1977) idea of economically costly commitments to an
ethical norm, and a much more recent approach allowing for
potentially conflictingmultiple selves (Gómez-Miñambres, forth-
coming).While both the harmonic and the conflictive approaches
can potentially offer explanations for the behavior observed in
the presence of incompatible needs and alternatives, it is a major
question whether the conflict is perceived as such by the decision-
maker or whether it is internalized as a unified problem leading
after all to the satisfaction of one’s own needs and preferences.
The former hypothesis would require accounting for the conflict
among opposite attractors of human behavior, potentially leading
to emotional arousal.
Several authors have addressed different aspects of corruption
in a variety of experimental settings. Regarding the framework
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 434 | 1
BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE
Jaber-López et al. Physio-corruption
adopted, we can distinguish between single-subject2 and
multi-subject settings. Within the multi-subject paradigm, a vari-
ation of which is also adopted in our study, several issues have
been addressed, like for example, the role of the matching proto-
col and the framing of the experimental setup3, as well as the role
of the subjects’ gender and culture4or identity5.Many studies seem
to focus on mechanisms and institutions which could enhance
or mitigate corruption6. Also related to our second treatment,
Abbink et al. (2014) report a bribery experiment run in India,
including a whistle-blowing option. They find that immunity for
bribe givers reduces the propensity of bribe-takers to demand
bribes and increases the willingness to report, which is found
to depend on intrinsic motivations. Finally, a setup which has
some similarities with our setting is used by Gneezy et al. (2013),
assuming a game involving two workers and a referee, finding that
when the referee keeps both workers’ bribes, the judgment seems
to be more motivated by the workers’ real performance. Despite
similarities with other settings, our framework is novel and yields
interesting insights on the emotional and behavioral aspects of
corruption.
The literature on integral7 emotions associated with specific
economic decisions has focused both on the conflicts preceding
the decision and on the feelings triggered by feedback received
after a decision is made. The existence of emotional arousal dur-
ing economic decision-making has been confirmed by several
studies8. In fact, physiological measures of emotion, mostly skin
conductance responses, have demonstrated that decision-making
2For example, the studies by Frank and Schulze (2000) and Schulze and Frank
(2003) use a single-subject setting to address the issue of compliance to a rule
in the context of a student film club in the presence of probabilistic detection.
The studies find that economics students are more propense to corruption
and that extrinsic motivations work at the cost of crowding out intrinsic moral
motivations.
3Abbink et al. (2002), Abbink (2004) and Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006)
study a two stage-two player game played between a potential briber and a
bribee. If a bribe is sent and accepted, respectively, a negative externality is
experienced by other subjects in the session. The authors find that less cor-
ruption is observed under a strangers matching protocol and that the framing
of the situation as bribery matters. The framing matters in the setup adopted
by Lambsdorff and Frank (2010, 2011), exposing subjects to an ultimatum
game with endogenous framing of first movers’ offers as a bribe or a gift.
4Cameron et al. (2009) and Alatas et al. (2009a,b) consider a bribery game
between a firm and a public official. Decisions affect the contamination of
a river, yielding a negative externality to other players. Culture, gender and
experience are shown to matter in this context. Recently, the effects of culture
and gender were revisited by Barr and Serra (2009, 2010) in a setup in which
the externality affects passive players (citizens). The role of citizens in cultural
differences between Pakistan and the US was investigated by Banuri and Eckel
(2012) in a setup based on Abbink et al. (2002).
5Based on a design by Azfar and Nelson (2007), focusing on the ease of cor-
ruption detection and the effect of wages on bribes, Barr et al. (2009) study
the role of framing and identities in an experiment run in Ethiopia.
6For example, Serra (2012) inverts the usual timing of the underlying game,
assuming that the public official is the one who asks for a bribe and the citizen
may accept paying it or not.
7As opposed to incidental emotions, which are not the effect but may cause
to some extent the decision. For discussion, see Peters et al. (2006). Examples
can be found in Van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2006) and Ariely and Loewenstein
(2006).
8Sanfey et al. (2003), Bechara (2004), Schwarz (2000) and Naqvi et al. (2006).
may influence and be influenced by somatic markers activated in
bioregulatory processes9. We contribute to this literature using
skin conductance reactions to specific decisions and feedback
from them. The framework proposed involves a moral dilemma
emerging in the presence of competing motivations resulting
from the contrast between selfish monetary reward maximiza-
tion and pro-social attractors of individual action. Related to
our approach, Coricelli et al. (2010) and Coricelli et al. (2014)
have established that economic decisions involving some degree
of conflict with ethics cause significant emotional and, eventually,
somatic reactions. The main conclusion seems to be that vio-
lations of specific pro-social norms is reflected on higher levels
of arousal, which was shown to relate to the emergence of neg-
ative self-reported emotions. Our research extends this view by
being the first to show that high emotional arousal may also relate
to ethical behavior when a specific decision is made against the
purely selfish motivation of monetary reward maximization.
2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
2.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The framework studied here is inspired by Beck and Maher
(1986), Lien (1986), Burguet and Che (2004), Che (1993), and,
especially, Büchner et al. (2008). We explicitly introduce a trade-
off between bribe and quality bids. In the bidding stage, two firms
post-simultaneously sealed quality bids and bribes to be paid in
case the bidder is the winner of the auction. In the final stage, on
the basis of the bids received, an official chooses one of the bids.
The winner’s quality benefits all players, whereas the bribe is anti-
social and inefficient, as it is paid at the cost of a lower quality
and an extra loss by the bribing winner. Thus, firms face a moral
dilemma in the sense that the higher a firm’s promised bribe, the
more likely for the firm to be the winner of the auction. Also,
officials face a dilemma, as their selfish preference for bids entail-
ing higher bribes goes against the interest of all other players and
overall welfare.
In the experiment, we implement the following payoffs:
πofficial = F + a · Qwinner + Bwinner (1)
πwinner = F + a · Qwinner − c · Bwinner + R (2)
πloser = F + a · Qwinner (3)
where F is a fixed amount earned by each subject in each period,
Q and B are, respectively, the quality and bribe bids. R is the extra
monetary reward earned by the winner of the auction. Finally, a
denotes the social return of the winning project’s quality on each
player’s utility and c the cost per monetary unit of bribe tran-
ferred by the winner to the official. In order to limit the actions
of firm-subjects to pressing a single button, we have applied the
restriction Q + B = A for each firm-subject’s strategies, reflect-
ing the trade-off between quality and bribes. We have used the
parameter set (F, a, c,A,R) = (10, 1/2, 2, 10, 10)10.
9Van’t Wout et al. (2006), Crone et al. (2004), Bechara and Damasio (2005).
10The use of round numbers facilitates subjects’ calculations of the conse-
quences of their actions.
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2.1.1. Monetary payoff equilibrium prediction
Taking this payoff structure into account, implying that agents
care only for the monetary consequences of their actions and
assuming a continuous strategy space, the unique Nash equi-
librium is such that both firms’ bids involve (Q,B) = (5, 5).
That is, like in Bertrand competition, firms will be willing
to spend on the bribe as much as the bonus they obtain
from winning the auction. However, as usual, our experi-
ment is run with a discrete strategy space, allowing only
for integer quality and bribe bids. Then, multiple equilibria11
emerge including (Q,B) = (7, 3) and (Q,B) = (6, 4). In this
case, the unique continuous-strategy equilibrium (Q,B) = (5, 5)
becomes a weak equilibrium, because each firm is indifferent
between this and posting lower bribes, becoming a loser (with a
payoff of 12.5 in both cases).
2.1.2. Psychological payoff equilibrium prediction
We generalize the monetary payoff structure of the setup in (1–3),
using a linear specification of utilities with an agent-specific psy-
chological cost parameter, γ , capturing an agent’s aversion to
bribe due to ethical reasons, expressed as a loss per monetary
unit of bribe received by the official. Thus, the three agents’ utility
levels after the end of the auction are given by:
πofficial = F + a · Qwinner + (1 − γofficial) · Bwinner (4)
πwinner = F + a · Qwinner − (c + γwinner) · Bwinner + R (5)
πloser = F + a · Qwinner (6)
Assuming perfect information on the agents’ preferences and
symmetry in the sense that each firm correctly predicts that its
rival has a similar attitude to ethics, the following cases emerge:
1. If a ≥ 1 − γofficial, the highest quality project will be chosen
by the official and firms will bid only in qualities, leading to
the equilibrium: (Q,B) = (A, 0) independently of the firms’
preferences.
2. If a < 1 − γofficial, the highest bribe will be preferred by the
auctioneer. In that case, firms will bid with the maximum
bribe they can, as long as the generalized bribing cost does
not exceed the fixed amount R earned by the winner. Thus,
in equilibrium, firm i will bid (Qi,Bi) = (A − Rc+γi , Rc+γi )12.
Summarizing, the model predicts that officials may choose the
highest quality proposal if they are sufficiently bribery-averse,
while they will choose the bidder with the highest bribe other-
wise. In the perfect information setting discussed above, firms
faced with a quality-maximizing auctioneer, will not bid with
bribes, independently of their own preferences, whereas firms
anticipating a bribery-maximizing behavior by the auctioneer will
11The corresponding expected payoff matrix for the firms’ bidding subgame
is provided in the supplementary material.
12These equilibrium bids correspond to the continuous strategy case. With
discrete strategies, equilibrium (Qi,Bi) = (5, 5) disappears for γi > 0, while
as γi increases, equilibria (Qi,Bi) = (8, 2), (Qi,Bi) = (9, 1) and (Qi,Bi) =
(10, 0) emerge.
promise higher bribes, the less bribery-averse they are. In the
case of uncertainty regarding the official’s type, a generalized ver-
sion of this model would produce a continuum of equilibrium
predictions, depending on the percentage of pro-social officials
and the distribution of bribery-aversion costs. While the devel-
opment of a general model with these characteristics is beyond
the scope of this paper, it is rather straightforward consequence
of our setup that the distribution of officials’ and firms’ bribery-
aversion parameters will have the expected result of less bribery
and more pro-social project choices, the higher the density of
bribery-aversion parameters on larger values.
2.2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Two treatments were run 13, using a within-subject design. Subjects
were aware of the fact that new, supplementary instructions
would be given after period 15. During the first 15 periods, the
Baseline (T0) treatment was run, corresponding to the auction
described above, played repeatedly by fixed triplets of players,
each representing an economy of two firms and an official. At
the beginning of period 16, the Inspection (T1) treatment was
introduced with further instructions and new fixed roles and
matching of players. In T1, after each auction has been resolved
by the auctioneer, the loser can activate the “Inspect” option
to reveal a possible bribe. A revealed bribe leads both players
involved to the loss of their period earnings, whereas, if no bribe is
revealed, the denouncing firm loses all its period profits instead.
This extreme setup for the inspection and punishment mecha-
nism does not affect the theoretical equilibrium predictions of the
model, given that, in theory, losers should not use the inspection
option because of its negative expected payoff. Given the lower
complexity of T0 compared to T1, we kept the order of the two
conditions fixed to guarantee that subjects’ learning in T0 helped
them adapt faster to the more complex situation in T1. This also
helped us to avoid having too few observations in any of the
subcases (like for example no bribe in T0).
2.3. PROCEDURES
A total of 93 subjects participated in the experiment follow-
ing the usual recruitment and ethical clearance protocols used
in the LEE at the Universitat Jaume I (Castellón, Spain)14.
Given the technical restrictions associated with the continuous
measurement of skin conductance, each session consisted of small
groups of 12 or 9 subjects each15.
2.3.1. Behavioral and physiological data collection procedures
The experiment was computerized using the z-Tree toolbox
(Fischbacher, 2007). Continuous electrodermal activity was
recorded during the entire experimental session using a BIOPAC
MP150 system and four TEL100C telemetry modules (BIOPAC
systems, Inc). Two Ag/AgCl electrodes filled with isotonic gel were
placed on each subject’s distal phalanges of the middle and the
index fingers of the non-dominant hand. The BIOPAC amplifier
13Instructions to the subjects are provided in the supplementary material of
the paper.
14Specifically, 46 male and 47 female undergraduate student-subjects were
recruited by means of the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004).
157 sessions of 12 subjects and one of 9 subjects.
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applies a constant voltage of 0.5 V to provide a continuous mea-
sure of the skin conductance level between the two electrodes, as
this varies with sweat gland activity. Specifically, activation of the
sympathetic nervous system due to emotional arousal results in
marked increases of the skin conductance level. When evoked by
particular experimental events, these increases in conductance are
called skin conductance responses (SCRs) (Dawson et al., 2007).
The skin conductance signal was sampled at 125Hz and low-pass
filtered offline at 0.5Hz using a Butterworth digital filter. SCRs
were automatically detected and their amplitudes were quantified
using a custom version of the Matlab EDA toolbox freely avail-
able at: https://github.com/mateusjoffily/EDA. False SCRs were
removed after visual inspection of the entire signal. SCRs were
associated to a specific decision if their onset appeared at least
1.0 s after subjects were informed about their choices and before
the moment of the decision. SCRs were associated to a feed-
back event when their onset appeared between 1.0 and 3.0 s after
the display of the feedback screen. Only responses above 0.02
microSiemens (μS) were considered as valid. Group average SCRs
were obtained by averaging across events of the same condition
(e.g., decisions involving bribe) the values at each time sample.
A non-parametric permutations test based on 200 surrogate data
sets, obtained by permutating the data points at each sample from
all individual trials of each subject, was subsequently carried out
to detect statistical differences between conditions. To control for
false positive statistical error, the false discovery rate correction
method for multiple comparisons was used.
2.3.2. Timing of behavioral events for continuous-time
physiological measurements
Physioeconomics is a new interdisciplinary area of research, com-
bining experimental economics and psychophysiology. Both dis-
ciplines use computerized solutions to manage stimuli, strategies,
feedback and collect the data. The hardware and software used in
our study pose a challenge regarding the need to collect and inter-
actively communicate the timing of behavioral and physiological
events across the two computer systems. We have used a solution
which to the best of our knowledge has not been previously used
in any physioeconomics study so far. As argued in Perakakis et al.
(2013), it is the most accurate methodology for the synchronized
timing of behavioral data and physiological reactions. The main
challenge is how to synchronize, free of undesirable network-
related lags, the z-Tree-assisted strategy submission, information
screens and feedback on one hand, with the accurate timing (with
2ms precision) of events necessary for the association of SCR
data to their corresponding stimuli. The method relies on the use
of photodiodes16, detecting the change across subsequent z-Tree
screens, on which a small “black box” appears on the upper left
corner of each odd-number screen.
3. RESULTS
3.1. THE SAMPLE
The behavioral results reported here are based on the sample
of 93 participants (31 officials and 62 firm-subjects). Following
16A photodiode is a type of photodetector capable of converting light changes
into electric signals.
the two random matchings and role assignments, in T0 there
were 15 male officials and 32 male firm-subjects, whereas in
T1 there were 13 male officials and 34 male firm-subjects17.
Physiological results are based on a slightly smaller sample of
89 subjects, given that 4 subjects were excluded due to partly or
fully missing information on the recording of their electrodermal
activity.
3.2. BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Figure 1 presents the main patterns observed regarding the
behavior of subjects. As seen on Figure 1A, in T0, 81.4% of
the decisions by officials are compatible with monetary reward
maximization (excluding ties, in which the distinction is not
meaningful). The remaining decisions (18.6%) are pro-social,
corresponding to the choice of the bid with the highest quality,
against the official’s monetary reward maximization. The pattern
is reversed in the presence of an inspection option. Specifically,
in T1, the majority of officials’ choices (54.55%) become pro-
social. Regarding the behavior of firm-subjects in T0, Figure 1B
shows a stable pattern of bribe averages slightly below 3 in T0
and a rapidly decreasing trend of bribes in T1. On average, the
inclusion of an inspection option in T1 leads to a statistically
significant (Mann-Whitney z = 15.78, p < 0.01) decrease of
bribes from 2.66 to 0.81 monetary units. In fact, as seen on
Figure 1C, bribe bids in T1 exhibit a high concentration on 0,
which becomes the modal strategy chosen by firm-subjects in
over a 70% of the cases as opposed to slightly above 10% in T0.
Nevertheless, in T0, subjects’ behavior has remained within the
pro-social range, with almost a fifth of officials’ decisions being
compatible with a bribery-averse parameter of γ > 1/2 and a
bribe average slightly below 3, which is the minimum predicted
in the monetary reward-maximizing equilibria. In fact, over 40%
of bribe choices are 0, 1, or 2 units. In T1, the introduction of the
inspection option has drastically enhanced pro-social behavior,
by both officials and firm-subjects, especially toward the last peri-
ods, in which average bribes fall below 1, despite the fact that the
inspection option has been rarely used (in 87 of 465 or 18.71% of
all instances possible) and gradually abandoned by the losers, as
shown on Figure 1D, falling from 41.93% (13 out of 31 cases) in
period 16 to 6.45% (2 out of 31 cases) in period 30. Interestingly,
from all the cases in which an inspection has been activated
(N = 87), a 44.83% (N = 39) corresponds to losing firm-subjects
who had offered a bribe in the same period, whereas the majority
(55.17% of them, N = 48) of inspecting losers had not offered a
bribe. In few words, our behavioral results reveal the presence of
intrinsic pro-social motivations, but the presence of the extrin-
sic threat posed by the possibility of an inspection is shown to
have a drastic pro-social effect, despite the fact that inspection is
only activated in the minority of cases, rendering the threat ex
post-efficient, as it enhances pro-social behavior at a negligible
social cost.
17Gender differences were statistically non-significant for behavioral results
in T1 and physiological responses throughout the study. The only gender
differences found in T0 is that women in the role of firms bribe more (Mann-
Whitney z = −2.07, p < 0.05) and in the role of officials exhibit a stronger
preference for higher quality bids (Chi-square test z = 14.43, p < 0.01).
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A B
C D
Officials’ decisions Bribe evolution
Bribe distribution Inspection frequency evolution
FIGURE 1 | Behavioral results. (A) Officials’ decisions. (B) Bribe evolution. (C) Bribe distribution. (D) Inspection frequency evolution.
3.3. PHYSIOLOGICAL RESULTS
From the discussion so far, we have seen that in our setup intrin-
sic pro-social motivations co-exist with extrinsic motivations
like standard monetary reward maximization and the additional
threat of punishment for anti-social behavior. Having created
these motivations in the laboratory environment, we are now
interested in the emotions triggered by different stages of the
decision-making process, as well as by the feedback received.
Figure 2 displays average SCRs associated to decisions made
by officials and firm-subjects. Specifically, Figure 2A shows
SCRs related to officials’ project assignment decisions in T0. We
compare the average SCR related to decisions favorable to bribes
with those favorable to a bribe-free bid. We find that decisions
deviating from monetary maximization are associated to higher
arousal than those giving the license to bribers as dictated by
monetary reward maximization (significant differences at p <
0.05 were found at a latency range between 6.27 and 7.08 s post-
stimulus). Figure 2B shows SCRs corresponding to the officials’
project assignment decisions in T1. In this case, decisions opting
for the bid with a bribe demonstrate a higher emotional response
(p < 0.05 between 11.8 and 12.2 s). Before interpreting these
findings, we turn to the decisions of firm-subjects. Figure 2C
compares the average SCRs associated to decisions made by
firms at the moment of posting their bids in T0. Decisions not
to bribe entail an increased emotional arousal compared to
those who do bribe (p < 0.01 between 3.57 and 4.71 s). Finally,
Figure 2D represents the same decision event in the inspection
treatment (T1), where higher arousal is associated with bribing
(p < 0.01 between 2.45 and 2.72 s). Therefore, higher arousal
levels in T0 are not associated with bribe-giving or bribe-taking
but, rather, with individually unprofitable choices. Contrary
to T0, in T1, higher arousal levels are associated with bribery.
However, observe that while accepting or offering a bribe in T0 is
a dominant strategy if we assume that subjects are bribe-neutral
and maximize own monetary payoffs, in T1, bribes entail the
risk of a significant monetary loss, rendering anti-social behavior
individually unprofitable. Thus, a coherent explanation of the 4
patterns observed in Figure 2 is that higher arousal levels corre-
spond to decisions deviating from the objective of maximizing
the decision-maker’s monetary reward. It is interesting to note
that such exciting decisions deviate from the majority choice.
In fact, the results obtained for T1 under the threat of being
discovered and punished are in accordance with those obtained
by Coricelli et al. (2010) and Coricelli et al. (2014), indicating
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A B
C D
Officials’ SCR following project choice screen (T0) Officials’ SCR following project choice screen (T1)
Firms’ SCR following bid decision screen (T0) Firms’ SCR following bid decision screen (T1)
FIGURE 2 | Emotional responses. (A) Officials’ SCR following project choice screen (T0). (B) Officials’ SCR following project choice screen (T1). (C) Firms’
SCR following bid decision screen (T0). (D) Firms’ SCR following bid decision screen (T1).
that the negative emotions found in those studies were more
likely related with the fear of being discovered to evade than with
regret due to non-compliance with a pro-social norm. Therefore,
an alternative way to frame or complement the aforementioned
explanation is that subjects deviating from pure monetary reward
maximization do not only deviate from the strategy dictated by
their own pecuniary interest, but also from the strategy chosen
by the majority of subjects. An important implication of this
finding is that, when choosing in the presence of conflicting
motivations, human actions do not equalize (dis)utilities across
the alternatives available to them. Instead, conflicts are reflected
on emotions which persist after the decision is made and they are
perceived stronger, the more a given decision deviates from the
basic motivation of monetary reward maximization. Therefore,
skin conductance results show an interesting overall pattern
concerning bribers. They demonstrate higher arousal when they
do not bribe in the baseline treatment and when they do in the
inspection one, namely, when they opt for the least common
and potentially least profitable strategy in each case. Bribe-takers
react in a similar manner, indicating that passive bribery carries
also a moral burden.
While the discussion so far concerns emotions triggered by
subjects’ decisions, emotional arousal may also emerge from the
anticipation of the consequences of others’ actions. A rather
expected pattern concerns the emotional response obtained due
to the anxiety experienced by the winners while waiting for the
loser’s decision to activate an inspection or not. Figure 3 shows
that bribing winners waiting for losers to decide whether to
audit them or not exhibit significantly higher emotional arousal
compared to honest winners (p < 0.05 between 1.8 and 3.4 s).
Winners’ skin-conductance while waiting for loser to decide whether
to order an inspection
FIGURE 3 | Winners’ skin-conductance while waiting for loser to
decide whether to order an inspection.
3.3.1. Response times
We argue here that emotional arousal emerges from a conflict
between monetary and ethical attractors of behavior. Thus, we
would expect ethical decisions dictated by pro-social incentives to
lead to emotional arousal if the corresponding decision contra-
dicts the basic instinct of selfish monetary reward maximization.
Our results are compatible with this view. First of all, we find
a positive and significant correlation (Spearman ρ = 0.12, p <
0.01) between arousal and response times. To be more spe-
cific, in Figure 4 we plot the distribution of response times in
the Inspection treatment per decision type. Recall that in this
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Bribe vs Quality maximization (officials) Bribe vs No Bribe (firms) Inspection vs No Inspection
A B C
FIGURE 4 | Response times for T1. (A) Bribe vs. Quality maximization (officials). (B) Bribe vs. No Bribe (firms). (C) Inspection vs. No Inspection.
treatment, the majority choice was the pro-social one, because
of the inspection risk. First, in Figure 4A it is seen that offi-
cials decide faster when they choose higher quality projects.
Similarly, according to Figure 4B, bribing firms take longer to
make their decisions. Finally, on Figure 4C we see that losers
take less time to decide not to inspect than to inspect. In all
these cases, the negative expected profit of the anti-social deci-
sion corresponds to higher emotional arousal, as shown by our
SCR data. In few words, the more subjects do something against
their expected monetary interest, the longer it takes for them to
decide, presumably because of conflicting internal motivations.
Thus, in our case, emotional choices can be seen as choices
that create conflict or internal dissonance that probably needs
even more cognitive processing or reasoning in order to resolve
the conflict and make a decision. Rubinstein (2014) associates
longer response times with contemplative decisions, as opposed
to instinctive and thus faster ones. In Rubinstein (2007), it was
argued that instinctive, thus emotional, decisions are usually
made faster than those resulting from a cognitively demanding
processing. So, in accord with Rubinstein and common sense,
more cognitive processing requires more time, although the term
instinctive used in Rubinstein (2007) should not be confused with
emotional, which, as we show here is more likely in the pres-
ence of a moral conflict and specifically, when the decisions made
contradict reward maximization.
4. DISCUSSION
Economic decisions are often made in contexts generating con-
flicting motivations. Such conflicts have increasingly attracted
the attention of economists, psychologists and decision theo-
rists. Several studies, like Coricelli et al. (2010) and Coricelli
et al. (2014) have shown that selfish economic decisions with a
negative public externality may cause a moral conflict reflected
on the decision-maker’s emotional arousal. In fact, both studies
had also obtained subjects’ self-reported emotions, finding that
negative feelings were triggered by non-compliance with a pro-
social norm. However, in both of these papers, non-compliance
occured in the presence of a threat of punishment through pub-
licity of the photos of subjects engaging in tax evasion. Therefore,
any intrinsic aversion to tax evasion or regret for it co-existed
with extrinsic threats against anti-social behavior. In this paper,
in the context of a public procurement auction with a bribe
possibility and punishment options, we find that it is not the
violation or compliance with a given ethical norm per se which
triggers the emotional arousal, but rather the actual decision to
act against one’s own monetary interest. Complementing our
SCR data with response times, we establish that decisions which
may or may not be pro-social may cause an increased emotional
arousal, as long as they deviate from the objective of monetary
reward maximization. From a methodological point of view, our
results suggest that, so far, emotional arousal may have been
wrongly associated only with unethical behavior, because it may
have been triggered by an ethical decision against the decision-
maker’s selfish motivation. However, emotional arousal is a reli-
able marker to detect a subject’s anxiety due to unethical behavior,
while waiting for inspection and punishment by another
person.
Future research should pursue obtaining more evidence on the
correlation between response times and physiological manifesta-
tions of emotions. The extent to which the former can be used as
a proxy of the other is of great interest to behavioral economists.
Furthermore, more evidence is needed in order to establish the
share of fear of being punished in the negative emotions associated
with the violation of a pro-social norm.
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